Amphibious Landings 1915-1951

Experience, theory and practice

One of the ironies of war is that it is both a deadly and innovative pursuit. New inventions, theories and techniques often emerge first on the battlefield. During the first half of the twentieth century, a new type of warfare emerged out of necessity. Massive, mechanized beachhead invasions with air support became necessary to dislodge the ever more sophisticated forces and fortifications that existed. The Allies were forced by events and geography to mount some of the most complex invasions ever devised. The lessons learned in each war, World Wars One and Two and the Korean conflict, would be applied to all future wars. Amphibious invasions have been conducted throughout history. Some tactics used today date back thousands of years.

The changes in equipment and the nature of war during the 20th century were rapid. Early amphibious operations were crudely organized and, often times, not successful. Later operations were meticulously planned. The same learning process will apply in the 21st century. In today’s world the threat of large nation-states is no longer as severe. Today’s enemy is more scattered and less identifiable. This brings two questions to mind: How applicable are the lessons of past amphibious operations to today’s environment? And, is the large-scale amphibious landing obsolete?

Historical Background

Amphibious warfare has a flexible definition, but several common elements are always present. The term “Amphibious” refers to naval forces making entry into enemy lands. Amphibious landings range from extremely large-scale operations like the WWII invasion of Normandy, to covert commando raids behind enemy lines.

Amphibious operations can be traced back to the time of ancient Egypt. Hieroglyphics portray the menace of invaders from the sea. Expressions of such attacks were also presented in the literature and plays of the time. A large scale amphibious operation occurred at Marathon in about 400 B.C. There are indications that this was the largest amphibious operation until the action at Gallipoli two millennia later. 1

During the 1700s, the expanding European powers mounted a number of amphibious operations. At Quebec in 1759, the British attempted a landing of some 4,000 troops in an attempt to take the city from the French. The landing failed, but a second attempt was more successful and the city eventually fell to the British.  2

The Continental Marines, forerunner of the modern day United States Marines, made a successful landing in Nassau during 1776. The Spanish followed suit, making several successful landings during the same area. Many times, siege tactics would precede the actual invasion.

During the American Civil War, the island forts along the coast of South Carolina were the sites of many landing operations. By this time, naval technology had taken a step forward. Better firepower aboard civil war era ships allowed for better support of invading ships. Even so, siege tactics were still common. The initial focus would be to cut of supply lines and soften the target before the actual invasion was mounted. The use of stealth was still in its infancy, but would come to play a large part in the wars of the 20th century.

By the time of World War One, technology had actually surpassed the

1., 2.  NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1,

2007)

development of tactics. The result was the most lethal war in history. The Industrial revolution spurred great advances in armaments. Air power was becoming a factor, though tactics were still in their infancy. Amphibious assaults, even when initially successful, became bogged down in trench warfare.

Some countries had specially trained marine forces at the time, but they were not large enough in number to significantly alter the course of the war. By and large, invasions were conducted by regular army troops. These troops were unprotected, having to row ashore in open whale boats.

The two decades between World War One and World War Two were a time of rapid development. The hard lessons of the First World War were analyzed thoroughly. There would be an obvious need, in future wars, for more comprehensive strategies, more expansive marine forces and more specialized equipment.

Amphibious operations in World War Two were no less deadly ventures. At the same time as the field of amphibious warfare was advancing, so were the techniques and equipment used to defend against it. However, the tactical and technical advances made in the interwar period at least provided the assault troops with a chance of success. In 1950, at Inchon, Korea, amphibious operations reached their peak of effectiveness.

World War One

The first large scale amphibious operations of World War One were tragically disastrous. An assault in 1914 by a British Indian Army force not only resulted in high casualties, but also in a tremendous loss of equipment. 3 The 1915 invasion of Gallipoli was even worse, as ill-prepared troops met with well-prepared defenders.

3.  Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996).

Gallipoli

Gallipoli is a peninsula located within the Dardanelles, a narrow strait located in a key strategic position in Eastern Europe. The Ottoman Empire, along with German forces, mined the area heavily and erected a ring of fortifications around the area. The narrowest part of the strait had ten lines containing more than three hundred mines. From shore, artillery batteries, lights and torpedoes awaited any invaders.

As a result, shipping and communications from the Black Sea were cut off. These outcomes damaged the ability of Russia to remain a potent force in the war. The allies needed Russia to occupy Germany on a second front.  4

In late 1914, a failed naval attack was mounted on the area by the allied forces. Commanders realized that the Dardanelles could not be taken without an integrated land/sea force. In 195, a Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was assembled to undertake the task. Under General Sir Ian Hamilton, the force landed on the Gallipoli peninsula at Cape Hellas.

On 25 April 1915, more than three hundred vessels approached the shoreline. The troops loaded into lifeboats and other small craft and made for shore. The lack of mechanized landing craft was a potential weakness of the invasion plan. Troops who could evade the incoming fire were already exhausted upon reaching shore after having rowed hundreds of yards.  5

The Gallipoli attack was three pronged. One group of forces was to move in at the southern end of Gallipoli, secure the beach, and then move inland. At the end of the second

4. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996).

5. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996), 54. stage, the battle group was to reach the Achi Baba hill, six miles inland. At the same time, another battle group entered farther north on the peninsula and was to push inland and rendezvous with the troops from the first group. A third group was to enter at a strategic position where it could reinforce the other two groups.

The invading group initially experienced marginal success. Resistance was not as strong as had been expected. From this point, the lack of an efficient communication system, lack of actionable intelligence and hesitation would jeopardize the mission.

Early casualty reports were mixed. Some groups had gotten through relatively unscathed the first day, while others came under withering fire in their unprotected landing boats.

The Allied commanders were well aware that the troops rowing to shore could be sitting ducks, but better ways of landing these soldiers were still in the development phase. One ship, a converted steamer called the River Clyde, was one such experiment. 6 The ship itself was actually designed to run aground. Soldiers could then exit through large hatches and run down causeways on the sides of the ship. Unfortunately, the causeways malfunctioned. 7 Almost half the soldiers were trapped aboard the grounded ship. The other soldiers, unable to move quickly, were pinned down in defensive positions.

None the less, the forces who did establish beachheads could have moved inland quickly had they not hesitated. The defensive forces of the Turks and Germans had been designed for mobility and quick response. 8 As the Allied forces hesitated, the defenders began to regroup.

6. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996), 67.

7. Simon Foster. Hit the Beach! (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995), 22.

8. Simon Foster. Hit the Beach! (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995), 33.

A strong counter attack drove some of the landing forces back to the beach area, where they held on waiting for reinforcements. The journey was a long one, however, for

the Allied reinforcements. Turkish defenders had the advantage of being able to reinforce more quickly. For British troops, there could be three or more ship changes by the time they arrived on shore. This meant reinforcements could take two weeks or more to arrive.

In later missions, the Allies would solve some of the problems encountered at Gallipoli. For example, converted ocean liners were used as transports. These ships could carry far larger numbers of troops than existing transport vessels. In addition, the liners were too fast to be easy targets for German U-Boats and their torpedoes.

An attempt to target the defenses with naval bombardment, done to good effect in later wars, was attempted. The inability to assess the true effect of this attempt would cost the Allies. Gilbert writes:

On reaching their beach they found that the preliminary naval bombardment had failed to inflict serious damage on the barbed wire entanglements along the shore. 9

Gallipoli also represented an early, if not fully developed, usage of aircraft in amphibious operations. Once the beachheads were held, balloons and other aircraft were called in primarily for reconnaissance purposes. 10 The aircraft could spot the Turkish and German defensive implements, then report their locations to artillery batteries on the ground for better targeting. This was a key element, allowing the Allies to hold on after nearly being driven back into the sea. This small victory was costly, however. By the end

9.  Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996), 82

10. Simon Foster. Hit the Beach! (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995). 64.

of the first day, the Allies had landed 30,000 troops. Two days in, the casualty list had grown to 20,000.  11

As months passed, the Battle of Gallipoli became a stalemate. A second landing

took place in late 1915. By this time communications and equipment had improved, but once again the Allies hesitated to move inland allowing the Turks time to reinforce. Repeated attacks resulted in tremendous casualties and yet another stalemate. As the mission bogged down into trench warfare, a high percentage of casualties on both sides would be caused by disease. Sluggish supply lines, dead bodies and the cramped trench environment provided a perfect breeding ground for dysentery and other virulent diseases.

In 1916, nearly two years after the Gallipoli operation had begun, the Allies decided to begin a phased withdrawal. “Ill luck and error, combined with the unexpected vigour of the defenders”, ultimately doomed the mission. 12

This mission was disastrous in terms of casualties, loss of equipment and overall morale. It would not be the last such failed mission. If nothing else, Gallipoli provided a tremendous learning experience for war planners. These lessons would be gradually capitalized on during the First World War. The benefits would not truly come to fruition, though, until World War Two.

World War Two

During the first years of the war many amphibious operations, particularly for the allies, took the form of evacuations rather than invasions. Several major evacuation operations were undertaken around the world, the most famous of these occurring at

11., 12.  Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996), 43.

Dunkirk. Large numbers of British and French troops were trapped on the French shoreline by the rapid German advance. Had these troops not been able to escape, the Germans could have dealt a near fatal blow to allied resistance in Europe.

Innovations put into place since WW1 allowed the British to enter Dunkirk and remove the troops more quickly than ever before. The potential losses avoided are staggering From the NavalHistory.net website:

            In the first four days and nights of June (1943), 64,000, 26,000,

            27,000 and 26,000 men were saved, bringing the overall total to

            340,000, including the bulk of Britain’s army in northern France.  13

Similar evacuations, on a smaller scale, were performed in Norway (1940), Western France (1940), Greece (1941), Crete (1941) and Singapore (1942). 14 These evacuations proved critical for the Allies. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were saved to fight in later battles. Strategically, the Allies learned a lot about how to move personnel quickly on and off shore while under enemy pressure. These experiences benefited the Allies in the attack operations that would come later in the war.

Significant amphibious battles occurred in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, the Middle East and in Africa. In no previous war had so many amphibious assaults been conducted. The largest of these was the allied invasion at Normandy, France in 1944… In the Pacific, amphibious operations were somewhat smaller, but more numerous. In each case tactics had to be tailored to the particular target. In addition, the value of communications and deception would be fully realized in this war.

13. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

14. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

With many new innovations in place and the American industrial giant fully on war footing, the difficulty of mounting amphibious operations lay not so much in the lack of equipment, but in the lack of trained men. Generally speaking, the Allied countries were seeking to shrink the size of the militaries after World War One. The failed amphibious invasions of WW1 also caused some military and political leaders to question the need for retaining a large number of specially trained marines. Once the buildup of the German military became clear, the Allies would have to play catch-up. Some preparations came faster than others. Navy V ice Admiral George Carroll Dyer wrote:

            …ships and their landing craft could be built faster than the officers

            and seamen to man them and their landing craft could be trained to

            do their difficult tasks. 15

An amphibious assault on a large-scale is one of the most difficult military operations to carry out. Even to plan the attack requires the development of a “complex

interservice organization.”. 16 The defenses against an amphibious mission had also improved greatly in the interwar years. Larger, more accurate guns that could target an enemy well away from shore were developed. Modern materials were used to construct better-protected defensive positions. More deadly mines were developed to target incoming troops. All this meant that the onus, for attacking forces, was on meticulous planning and deception. Even when both of these things were present, many things can still go wrong.

The nature the war in the Pacific theater also required an emphasis on the

15. George Carroll Dyer. The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Vol. II). (Annapolis, MD: U.S.

Dept. of the Navy. 1969), 1005

16. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002), 53.

development of amphibious tactics and equipment. The Japanese had quickly taken over the multitude of islands stretching from mainland Japan toward Hawaii. The Allies knew they could not effectively target Japan without first driving them from these strategic islands. Dozens of amphibious assaults, of various sizes, would have to be carried out and reinforced to defend against counter attacks.

 Tarawa

In the Pacific theater, the first step in the allied “island hopping” campaign was Tarawa, a part of the Gilbert Islands. This island was heavily defended by the Japanese. Capturing the island was necessary to create a forward staging ground and establish critical communications links in the Pacific theater.

Nearly 5,000 well-equipped Japanese troops guarded the island, prepared to fight to the last man. A defensive wall was constructed along the only available shallow water landing area. On the other side of the island, a pier was constructed where ships carrying reinforcements could unload safely. 17 The terrain of the island itself also made the assault more difficult. Japanese forces were able to concentrate around an inland mountain. There was also an airstrip near the middle of the island. In order to assault these two targets invading forces would have to fight their way through heavy jungle.

An elite Japanese marine unit, led by Commander Takeo Sugai, guarded the island.  Coastal defense guns located in concrete caissons encircled the island. About five hundred other pill boxes constructed from available materials we located throughout the island. 18 A system of trenches was also designed, allowing troops to move safely from

17. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002)

18. Gordon Rottman. US World War II Amphibious Tactics, Army and Marine Corps,

Pacific Theater. (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. 2004).

one area to another on the island. The Japanese command was confident that the island could not be taken.

On the 20th of November 1943, the allied invasion force opened fire on the island. The force contained more than 30,000 soldiers, 17 aircraft carriers, a dozen each battleships and cruisers, over 60 destroyers and three dozen transport vessels. Early shelling and bombing was designed to soften the Japanese defenders, paving the way for a manned invasion. 19

The invasion force would have to be substantially large. The Allies met the challenge, assembling one of the largest invasion forces seen yet to that point in the war. A dozen battleships, 17 aircraft carriers and more than a hundred cruisers, destroyers and transport vessels moved toward the coast. On board 35,000 men waited to storm ashore.

Early bombardment had been effective, knocking out many of the coastal defense guns. The narrowness of the island allowed for a more effective concentration of fire upon the defenses. 20 Even so, there would be more defenders left than expected given the obvious destruction on the island.

The attack would simultaneously target three beaches on the island. An initial wave of invaders at the lagoon became pinned down on a reef. The new Amtrac transport vehicles had been designed to surmount such obstacles, but they were still too few in number to move the entire force. Japanese forces opened fire on the trapped soldiers and only a few were able to make it to the beach. Tank landings saw similar difficulties. Some tanks could not land. Others that did land were taken out immediately by mines,

19. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002)

20. Gordon Rottman. US World War II Amphibious Tactics, Army and Marine Corps,

Pacific Theater. (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. 2004).

impassable geography or Japanese fire.

Despite these difficulties, invading forces were able to secure the beach. As tanks began to move in unmolested, the entire Allied line surged forward. Their immediate goal

was to divide and isolate Japanese resistance. On the fourth day, the Japanese launched a failed counterattack. From that point on, Allied forces moved to consolidate their positions and secure the island.

The Japanese concept of “fight to the last man” was taken literally at Tarawa. In fact, only one officer and a handful of enlisted men lived at the end of the battle. More than 4,500 defenders were killed. The mission was costly for American forces as well. Over 1000 U.S. Marines were lost. 21 The high losses were shocking for the American public who could not yet fully understand the complicated and risky process of mounting an amphibious invasion. Unfortunately, losses at future operations would dwarf the number lost at Tarawa. The Tarawa campaign was more evidence that a small outnumbered group of defenders can, even if they eventually lose, inflict a great deal of damage. This campaign was finished in less than a week. Future campaigns would not move so quickly, as the Japanese were able to hone their defensive strategies. Meanwhile, the Allies were preparing to stage the European campaign. Entry into the European continent, where the Axis powers were able to mass their resources, would prove to be just as difficult.

North Africa

Having established that an invasion across the English channel was not yet

21. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1,

2007)

feasible, the Allies had to find another point of entry to the European confinement. The most logical place to enter was through Italy. For logistical and strategic reasons an Italian entry meant that the Allies would first have to enter North Africa.

American amphibious operations were scheduled to coincide with assaults by the

British Army, already present in substantial numbers. Three landings took place in late 1942 and early 1943. at Casablanca, 105 U.S. Navy ships brought in 35,000 troops. The invasion at Oran, Algeria was nearly identical in size. The third invasion, at Algiers, was also of similar size. 22 Initially, Vichy French troops provided naval and on-ground resistance. These troops were subdued in relatively short order. These three missions comprised what was, at the time, the largest amphibious operation on record. 23 This was a record that would fall more than once during World War Two.

The Italian Campaign

Simultaneous with the island hopping campaign in the Pacific, Allied forces invaded Italy to topple a German ally and gain a foothold on the European continent. With the Italians initially fighting with the Germans, the Italian campaign would be a bloody one. The Italian invasions, such as those at Sicily and Anzio provided much needed further experience that the Allies would capitalize on at the massive D-Day invasion in France.

During the early part of the war, the air forces were coming into their own as part of the amphibious forces. The Germans themselves had set the template, unleashing the Luftwaffe in advance of their invasions. Now the Allies used the same tactics in the

22. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

23. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002)

context of amphibious invasion. Morison describes one such example at the invasion of Sicily in July, 1943; “The penultimate contribution of the air forces was delivered…21 bombing and strafing missions struck airfields and other targets.” 24 The Sicilian campaign, in whole, utilized nearly 3, 000 warships and over 175,000 troops. Unlike in previous wars, the invading troops were able to deploy from far-flung locations such as

the United States, the UK and North Africa.

This joint operation, led by U.S. Navy Admiral H.K. Hewitt and Royal Navy Admiral Ramsey, was one of many similar operations conducted in the European theater. In some ways, the Allied forces were victims of their own success. Logistical problems emerged that harmed the efficiency of the operations. One such problem is illustrated by Samuel Morison; “The Gela beaches were so congested that many landing craft had to return to their ships fully loaded.” 25 Ironing out such problems has been a primary focus of military leaders throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

By 1944, the Italian regime had been toppled. Germany was left alone to defend the peninsula against overwhelming force. The Italian campaign was still difficult, though, and the remaining German troops were capable of inflicting a great deal of damage.

The invasion at Anzio was to prove costly and somewhat ineffective. In defending the area, German forces had certain advantages. The Germans were technically advanced military terms. They had revolutionized the use of fast-moving mobile units. They had also made many improvements in armaments, which they deployed to assist in the

24. Samuel Eliot Morison. Sicily-Salerno-Anzio:  January 1943-June 1944. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 59.

25. Samuel Eliot Morison. Sicily-Salerno-Anzio:  January 1943-June 1944. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 109.

defense of places like Anzio. Among these armaments; “The German defenders had guns capable of targeting to 30,000 yards, while the guns of the guns of the Allies could only reach 25,700 yards…” 26

The command structure of the German military was also conducive to rapid response operations. “German commanders would not need specific plans to respond to a

landing along the Italian coast”, according to Badsey. 27 The German commander at Anzio had not been deceived by the Allied bombing campaign designed to redirect his attention. He was prepared to mount a defense and call in fast-moving reinforcements.

The invasion force numbered 50,000, with over 100,000 more troops prepared to follow in short order. Over 250 landing craft carried the troops and materiel ashore. Twenty-eight cruisers and destroyers patrolled the immediate area. The entire armada numbered 369 ships, a slight majority of them from the British Navy.

While the landing at Anzio had succeeded in establishing a beachhead, it could move no further. Rapid German reinforcement resulted in the invading force being sealed off in the beach area. Months of bloody stalemate followed until the Germans were forced to redeploy to other critical areas.

It was too little, too late, but the operation at Anzio gave the Germans a template of how to defend against a large invasion. If commanders on the ground are given the opportunity to act independently, a defensive action can be mounted much more quickly. The invading army has the onus of establishing momentum early in the operation. If fast moving reinforcements are available for the defenders, the invasion can potentially be

26. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002), 63..

27. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002), 59.

sealed off. Even though the allies were able to hold the beachhead, a smaller number of

German troops essentially neutralized a large invading force.

            After the German evacuation of Anzio, Allied troops were able to consolidate and move up the Italian peninsula. It was still obvious, though that in order to win the war a large-scale invasion of Western Europe was necessary. It was also obvious that the cost in lives would be high. The Germans and their remaining Allies were consolidating their forces to defend against an invasion at all costs. After much debate and planning, a site and a date had been chosen.

D-Day – The Invasion of Normandy

Preparations for the invasion at Normandy began in earnest almost from the minute the United States entered the war in December, 1942. Meanwhile, the Nazi forces were continually working to secure the “Atlantic Wall”, a series of fortifications extending thousands of miles. The Germans were well aware that an attack would be mounted. Not only were the beach areas heavily armed, the coastal waters were mined and booby trapped with a plethora of devices designed to kill, or at least, slow any invading force.

Earlier in the war, the German Luftwaffe had established air superiority over most of Western Europe. By 1943, however, their advantage was eroding rapidly.

Still, invading troops would be faced with a 300 yard beach “interspersed with runnels and planted with mined obstacles”. 28 They then would have to negotiate barbed wire, a seawall and in some places, a steep bluff overlooking the shore.

The armada assembled for the Normandy invasion was unparalleled in its size and

28. Samuel Eliot Morison. The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-45. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 98.

planning. It was to be a multi-phase operation reliant on accurate intelligence and effective deception. In the words of Gen. Omar Bradley, “The cover plan involved a monumental scheme of deception…built around enemy agents, phony radio nets and a mock-up invasion fleet.” 29

            The novel feature of all landings on D-Day was an initial boat wave

             of eight LCT (Landing Craft Tank) each carrying four British-designed

            DD (dual drive) amphibious tanks. 30

Prior to the main invasion, artillery and air bombing, commandos and intelligence assets “prepared the field.” The main force was arranged into 5 lines, each heading toward an assigned beach. Minesweepers led the force in, followed by battleships, cruisers, sub chasers and LCT. Infantry and Marines would then follow, carried by several different types of landing craft. Overall, the initial operation was to consist of 26 waves of invading forces, including engineers who worked to assemble floating harbors, lading strips and a great many other necessities.

The force that prepared to strike in early June totaled at least 1,900 bombers, 7000 support aircraft and gliders,.800 warships, 6,000 transport vessels and 800 fighter planes. An attack force of this size had never before been assembled. Inevitably, logistical problems arose. In some cases, these problems had a direct impact on the soldiers.

            …the delays…meant that the 20 to 25 Marines in many of the Amtracs

            had to endure more than four hours in a crowded, wallowing craft before

29. Samuel Eliot Morison. The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-45.. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 74.

30. Samuel Eliot Morison. The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-45.. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 98.

being deposited on their appointed hostile beach.   31

Even though it resulted in an Allied victory, the attack at Normandy shows that, no matter how large the force, defenders still have an inherent advantage over invaders. Every possible aspect of Operation Overlord was planned meticulously, from the terrain to current speeds to enemy defense strategies. Still, things went wrong from the very start.

Paratroopers were landed miles away from target locations, mechanical problems surfaced and communications went down. Had the Germans promptly reinforced the defenders with available Panzer tank divisions, the operation still could have been

repelled. Normandy taught a fundamental lesson about amphibious operations. Badsey puts it this way: “For all the help they could be given, often success or failure hinged on the courage of the soldiers as they hit the beach.” 32

Iwo Jima

If World War Two highlighted the potential benefits of using aircraft in amphibious operations, it also exposed its weaknesses. Bombing campaigns to “soften up” the enemy were often ineffective against dug-in forces. Air navigation was not yet perfected, resulting in many missed targets. Air combat required intensive, costly training and the air forces also suffered extremely high casualty rates, particularly in Europe. As the war went on, the Japanese military became particularly adept at sheltering its troops from the initial waves of bombardment. The landscape of many of the islands of the South Pacific included heavy jungles, caves, soft sand or other features that could slow invading forces.

31. George Carroll Dyer. The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Vol. II). (Annapolis, MD: U.S.

Dept. of the Navy. 1969), 703.

32. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New York:

Barnes and Noble. 2002).53.

None the less, the United States Navy and Marines had become experts in

amphibious warfare, particularly in the far eastern theater. Knowledge and strategy had caught up with technological innovation. The U.S. military was a well-oiled machine moving from island to island and turning the war in the Pacific in their favor.

At the same time, the Japanese were becoming experts at defending against amphibious assaults. Even with their forces depleted, the Japanese were still capable of inflicting heavy losses on the Allies. In order to maximize this potential, a major change in strategy was in store.

The island of Iwo Jima lies approximately 100 miles south of Tokyo, Japan. During the war, it had served the Japanese well as a part of its early warning system. Fleets of Allied bombers could be spotted and word radioed to the mainland, allowing the Japanese critical preparation time. Despite this U.S. commanders were not unanimous in their opinion of Iwo Jima as a valuable target. General Henry Harley Arnold of the Army

Air Force was adamant, however. He wanted to use the island as a staging area for fighter planes escorting B-29 bombers on their missions over Japan. In the end, his opinion won the day. The Allies stormed Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945.

The Americans were in for a deadly surprise. The Japanese, under General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, had decided on a wholly defensive strategy. This was a complete departure from anything they had done previously. The invading forces expected a fierce counter attack at the beach, but it never came. The Japanese were essentially recognizing the inevitability of a defeat. Their goal was to inflict as much damage as possible and, more importantly, slow Allied progress toward mainland Japan. An innovative defensive system was devised.

Estimates had placed enemy resistance forces at about 13,000 in number. A naval review of the operation later states that the total number of defenders on the island was closer to 22,000. 33 During preparations, civilians were evacuated, concrete pillboxes were built and a vast network of underground tunnels was erected.

The depleted Japanese Air Force was not a factor, but the defenders still had access to about 400 large artillery guns, 200 smaller artillery guns, rocket guns and thousands of personal firearms.

The Allied force totaled over 100,000. Since the invasion had met little initial resistance, commanders may have assumed that days of preliminary bombardment had done substantial damage. In fact, it had not. The dug-in defenders were relatively unscathed.

After allowing the Allies to advance to a certain point, the Japanese opened fire. It

would take nearly a month to overcome the  well-protected and prepared defenders. In the end, nearly all of the 22,000 Japanese fighters were killed. In the process, though, they had inflicted heavy casualties of their own. Nearly 7000 Allied troops were killed, and the total casualties exceeded 27,000.

The Korean War

Even prior to the Korean War, many believed that the days of the large-scale amphibious invasion were over. In 1949, General Omar Bradley said;  “I predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never occur again.” 34 Additionally, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson said this in that same year:

33. George Carroll Dyer. The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Vol. II). (Annapolis, MD: U.S.

Dept. of the Navy. 1969), 993.

34. B.L. Kortegaard. “Inchon: Operation Chromite.” (http://www.kmike.com/inchon.htm

Accessed May 1, 2007).

We’ll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away

with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy

            can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy.  35

Within a year and a half, both men would be proven wrong. In 1950, the communist backed North Korean army poured across the border in to South Korea. Once again, America would mount a large, liberating invasion.

Inchon

General Douglas MacArthur designed a bold invasion at Inchon, one hundred miles behind enemy lines. The object was to cut off retreat and supply lines for the North Koreans. Preliminary bombing, now typical of amphibious operations, began the week of September 15, 1950. An armada of more than 300 ships carrying 70,000 men approached Inchon on the 15th.

            Key to the success of the invasion were the Tank Landing Ships (LST) that had

been developed during World War Two. They were slow moving, but versatile, transport ships. The ships could place vehicles, tanks, and critical supplies for invading infantry troops directly on the shore.

            The LST had a 328 foot length and 50 foot beam and could carry

            A 2,1oo ton load. These ships were the stars of many World War

            Two operations, and their crews proudly served in them.  36

            In the postwar years, defense budget cuts had made these ships harder to come by. General MacArthur was able to acquire a number of them previously stationed in Japan

35. B.L. Kortegaard. “Inchon: Operation Chromite.” (http://www.kmike.com/inchon.htm

Accessed May 1, 2007).

36. Curtis A. Utz. Assault from the Sea; The Amphibious Landing at Inchon. (Wash. D.C.:

Naval Historical Center. 1994), 36..

and other foreign ports. After the outbreak of war in Korea, these ships were concentrated in the area in preparation for an attack.

The North Koreans were ill-prepared for such an audacious attack. The operation worked nearly flawlessly. In emphasizing speed and surprise, MacArthur had achieved a stunning victory. The North Korean forces were on the brink of total collapse until the Chinese entered the war on their behalf. The war then settled into a stalemate.

Theory, Practice and Analysis

The amphibious war experiences in World War One prompted militaries to develop new theories of war and new equipment to carry out their missions. The German war machine that emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s did much to prompt all major nations to make advancements. The major and obvious lesson of World War One was the need to avoid stalemate. That meant an emphasis had to be placed on speed of movement.

The German designed Blitzkrieg strategy was a devastating example of this theory being put into practice. The military would now make bold, if risky, strikes deep into enemy territory, relying on surprise and carefully-placed overwhelming force to win the day.

Amphibious warfare planners had to find a way to mount an amphibious form of Blitzkrieg. Emerging threats around the world showed the need for continual military buildup. Specially trained marine forces were expanded in the interwar period. There also needed to be better ways to get substantial forces ashore quickly. An array of specialized landing craft, including the LST (Tank Landing Ship) were developed prior to World War Two. As it became more and more obvious where future landing sites would be, more specialized craft to deal with shallow water, tidal conditions, and heavy enemy fire were developed. By the time of Inchon, the Navy and Marines were able to execute a near perfect behind-the-lines landing capable of moving quickly through enemy territory. Thirty-five years earlier, at Gallipoli, invading forces had the same goal but didn’t have the strategies or equipment to achieve it.

World War Two was a time that required great innovation and an ability to “think outside the box”. Good ideas, from whatever source, had to be explored. The Landing Ship Tank (LST-3009) was an amphibious assault vessel partially conceived by Winston Churchill himself.

At the beginning of the war, maintaining a strong amphibious assault capability was not a priority for the Allied powers. As a result there was some delay in their response to German and Japanese actions. This undoubtedly cost many lives. Theoretically, it could have cost the Allies the war. If the Axis could have stalled the Allied drive slightly longer, a new crop of devastating weapons were about to come on-line.

One lesson from World War One that was not lost on any of the combatants was the value of air power. As the Allied navies expanded during the war, dozens of large-scale amphibious landings were carried out. The success or failure of those missions was not determined solely by air power, but the Allies were learning how to use air power with an amphibious landing more and more effectively.

In amphibious or any other type of warfare the military that learns best from the past will be the best in the future. After learning the lessons from World War One, Germany was nearly able to take over the world. Williamson Murray says that; “the lessons learned provided Germany with the most reliable tactical doctrine available in Europe.”  37 The Allies, in turn, were able to effectively put to use lessons they learned at D-Day and at Inchon.

The Allied assault on Normandy was the most complex, coordinated and vast attack of all time. All the lessons from past wars regarding these types of invasions were utilized. In fact, an assortment of new equipment was invented especially for this attack.

In the years since the landing at Inchon, a tremendous emphasis has been placed on the development of air power. No matter how well an amphibious invasion is carried off a large number of casualties is inevitable. If a country can maintain a near-automatic air superiority against any foe, then much of the work done by invading forces can be done from the air with far fewer casualties.

History has shown, however, that this theory only applies to a limited extent. Is the large-scale amphibious operation obsolete? Probably not. If the free nations of the world are not prepared for amphibious warfare in the 21st century, other nations or entities are sure to take advantage of that fact. Two maxims that are equally true – The world is rapidly changing, and; history tends to repeat itself. Many times thought history the amphibious invasion has been declared obsolete. Competing forces within the military have sought to de-fund amphibious units. Other critics have said that technology makes amphibious operations no longer necessary.

If anything, the opposite is true. Technological advances have presented additional threats that only an amphibious operation may be able to deal with. These capabilities provide militaries with a much greater flexibility – an asset that is essential in

37. Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millet (eds.). Military Innovation in the Interwar

Period. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999), 84. these uncertain times. The lessons of the past tell us to expect the unexpected. Analysis of the past can tell us a lot about how to prepare for the future. Failure to be prepared for any possibility is not an option.

Notes

1. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

2. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

3. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York:

H.Holt.1996).

4. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H.Holt.

1996).

5. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt.

1996), 54.

6. Simon Foster. Hit the Beach! (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995), 33.

7. Simon Foster. Hit the Beach! (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995), 22.

6. Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt.

1996), 67.

9.  Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt.

1996), 82

10. Simon Foster. Hit the Beach! (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995). 64.

11.  Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996),

43.

12.  Martin Gilbert. The First World War: A complete history. (New York: H. Holt. 1996),

43.

13. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

14. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May 1, 2007)

15. George Carroll Dyer. The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Vol. II). (Annapolis, MD:

U.S. Dept. of the Navy. 1969), 1005.

16. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Barnes and Noble, 2002), 53.

17. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Barnes and Noble. 2002)

18. Gordon Rottman. US World War II Amphibious Tactics, Army and Marine Corps,

Pacific Theater. (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. 2004).

Barnes and Noble. 2002)

19. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Pacific Theater. (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. 2004).

20. Gordon Rottman. US World War II Amphibious Tactics, Army and Marine Corps,

21. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May

1, 2007)

22. NavalHistory.net. “Campaign Summaries of World War 2: Amphibious operations.”

(http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaigns/Amphibious.htm  Accessed May

1, 2007)

23. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Barnes and Noble, 2002)

24. Samuel Eliot Morison. Sicily-Salerno-Anzio:  January 1943-June 1944. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 59.

25. Samuel Eliot Morison. Sicily-Salerno-Anzio:  January 1943-June 1944. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 109.

26. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Barnes and Noble. 2002), 63..

27. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Barnes and Noble. 2002), 59.

28. Samuel Eliot Morison. The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-45. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 98.

29. Samuel Eliot Morison. The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-45.. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 74.

30. Samuel Eliot Morison. The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-45.. (Edison, NJ:

Castle Books. 2001), 98.

31. George Carroll Dyer. The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Vol. II). (Annapolis, MD:

U.S. Dept. of the Navy. 1969), 703.

32. Stephen Badsey (ed.). Atlas of World War II Battle Plans: before and after. (New

York: Barnes and Noble. 2002).53.

33. George Carroll Dyer. The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Vol. II). (Annapolis, MD:

U.S. Dept. of the Navy. 1969), 993.

34. B.L. Kortegaard. “Inchon: Operation Chromite.” (http://www.kmike.com/inchon.htm

Accessed May 1, 2007).

35. B.L. Kortegaard. “Inchon: Operation Chromite.” (http://www.kmike.com/inchon.htm

Accessed May 1, 2007).

36. Curtis A. Utz. Assault from the Sea; The Amphibious Landing at Inchon. (Wash. D.C.:

Naval Historical Center. 1994), 36..

37. Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millet (eds.). Military Innovation in the Interwar

Period. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999), 84.

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